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‘Working in a new world’: Kuhn, constructivism, and mind-dependence 
 
Michela Massimi 
School of Philosophy, Psychology and Language Sciences 




In The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn famously advanced the claim that scientists 
work in a different world after a scientific revolution. Kuhn’s view has been at the center 
of a philosophical literature that has tried to make sense of his bold claim, by listing 
Kuhn’s view in good company with other seemingly constructivist proposals. The 
purpose of this paper is to take some steps towards clarifying what sort of constructivism 
(if any) is in fact at stake in Kuhn’s view. To this end, I distinguish between two main 
(albeit not exclusive) notions of ‘mind-dependence’: a semantic notion and an ontological 
one. I point out that Kuhn’s view should be understood as subscribing to a form of 
semantic ‘mind-dependence’, and conclude that semantic ‘mind-dependence’ does not 
land us into any worrisome ontological ‘mind-dependence’, pace any constructivist 
reading of Kuhn.  
 





Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions1 has without any doubt marked a 
turning point in the way history and philosophy of science has been practiced since. 
Against the irenic picture of scientific growth marshaled by the logical positivists, 
Lakatos, and Popper, Kuhn put forward a new picture of how science grows and 
unfolds, which was bound to attract endless controversies in the decades to come. 
Paradigm-change and incommensurability have become part of the tool-kit in history and 
philosophy of science, and continue to spark debates. In this paper, I want to focus my 
attention on one of the most famous and controversial aspects of Kuhn’s view, namely 
the claim that “though the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the 
scientist afterward works in a different world”.2 By latching onto the work of Nelson 
Goodman and Gestalt psychology, Kuhn argued that scientists never engage in the simple 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Kuhn (1962). 
2 Kuhn 1962; third ed. 1996, p. 121. 
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activity of interpreting given data. Experimental data cannot provide a hook to mind-
independent reality because laboratory manipulations and measurements are paradigm-
dependent. Moreover, different paradigms display different conceptual resources that 
make possible for scientists (before and after a scientific revolution) to see the world 
differently.  
Kuhn contended for example that Aristotelians saw a falling stone as “a change of 
state rather than a process (…) the relevant measures of motion were therefore total 
distance covered and total time elapsed, parameters which yield what we should now call 
not speed but average speed. Similarly, because the stone was impelled by its nature to 
reach its final resting point, Aristotle saw the relevant distance parameter at any instant 
during the motion as the distance to the final end point rather than as that from the origin 
of motion”.3 
Kuhn argued then that it is the conceptual switch from motion as distance to a final 
end point, to motion as distance from the origin that “underlies and gives sense to most 
of his [Galileo] well-known ‘laws of motion’” (ibid.). This conceptual switch was in turn 
made possible by “the impetus paradigm” and the Scholastic doctrine of the latitude of 
forms.4 According to the impetus theory, a stone gains increasing impetus as it recedes 
from its starting point, and hence starting point (rather than end point) became the 
relevant parameter in assessing the motion of falling stones. Similarly, Aristotle’s notion 
of speed changed over the Medieval period to include both what we now call ‘average 
speed’ and what became later known as ‘instantaneous speed’. Hence Kuhn’s conclusion: 
 
But when seen through the paradigm of which these conceptions were a part, the 
falling stone, like the pendulum, exhibited its governing laws almost on inspection. 
(…)[Galileo] had developed his theorem on this subject together with many of its 
consequences before he experimented with an inclined plane. That theorem was 
another one of the network of new regularities accessible to genius in the world 
determined jointly by nature and by the paradigms upon which Galileo and his 
contemporaries had been raised. Living in that world, Galileo could still, when he 
chose, explain why Aristotle had seen what he did. Nevertheless, the immediate 
content of Galileo’s experience with falling stones was not what Aristotle’s had 
been.5  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Ibid., 
4 Ibid., p. 124. 
5 Ibid., p. 125. Emphasis added. 
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The other example Kuhn mentioned in relation to the claim of “working in a new 
world”, is the passage from affinity theory to Dalton’s atomic theory, whereby the gas 
mixtures were reinterpreted in terms of specific combinations of whole-number ratios of 
atomic elements. Kuhn claimed that Dalton successfully operated the conceptual switch 
from mixtures to compounds because as a meteorologist, he thought that the absorption 
of gases by water remained a mystery that affinity theory could not explain, and as such 
he was immune from the chemical paradigm of his time.6  
How should we understand Kuhn’s claim that scientists before and after a 
revolution ‘work in a different world’? Ian Hacking7 has famously argued that the world 
consists of individuals, and as such it does not change during a scientific revolution. Yet, 
the world scientists work in and act upon is not a world of individuals but a world of 
kinds, and kinds typically change during a scientific revolution. More recently, Paul 
Boghossian has discussed Kuhn’s influence for constructivism, and in particular for a 
weak form of constructivism about rational explanation, as the view that evidence is never 
sufficient to underpin our beliefs. 8   
The goal of this paper is to clarify what sort of constructivism (if any) is licensed 
by Kuhn’s claim. I will go back to Kuhn’s example about Galileo’s falling stone and 
elucidate the sense in which it can make sense to say—as Kuhn did—that scientists 
before and after Galileo saw the falling stone differently. I will then draw conclusions 
about the implications of Kuhn’s view for constructivism by ruling out a prominent 
sense of ‘mind-dependence’, which I think has been mistakenly associated with Kuhn. 
My goal is to take Kuhn’s claim as a springboard for analyzing two possible ways of 
understanding the ‘working in a new world’ claim: (1.) an ontological sense; and (2.) a 
semantic sense, respectively. These two possible readings deliver two distinctive notions 
of mind-dependence, which—one way or another—seem to be at work in Kuhn’s 
contentious claim. I argue for three main points (the first historical, and the remaining 
two more philosophical): 
 
I. Pace Kuhn, there is a lot of historical continuity between the way Galileo saw the 
falling stone and the way in which the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition saw it. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid. pp. 133-5. 
7 Hacking (1993), p. 289. 
8 Boghossian (2006), pp. 118-125. Boghossian concludes that Kuhn’s incommensurability does not open 
the door to any such weak constructivist thesis, Kuhn’s influence on constructivism notwithstanding.  
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II. Kuhn’s ‘working in a new world’ claim is better understood as implying a form of 
semantic mind-dependence. 
III. Kuhn’s semantic mind-dependence does not license ontological mind-
dependence, pace readings of Kuhn as advocating some form of fact-
constructivism.  
 
Before plunging into the philosophical points II. and III., let us go back to Galileo and 
the falling stone.  
 	  
2. Galileo and the falling stone 
 
The purpose of this Section is to clarify from a historical point of view three main things: 
first, how Aristotelians saw the falling stone; second, how Galileo’s change in the way in 
which he could ‘see’ the falling stone was in continuity with important Medieval studies 
that built up on Aristotle’s view; and third, clarify from a historical point of view what 
Galileo saw new in the falling stone.  
First, what did Aristotelians see in the falling stone? Aristotle, just like Galileo 
after him, saw the falling stone as accelerating, although he was not clear about either the 
cause of the acceleration or its kinematic features. Aristotle seemed to have believed that 
bodies tend to accelerate the closer they get to their natural place: for example, falling 
stones would accelerate nearer to the earth as much as fire would accelerate nearer to the 
upper region (qua fire’s natural place). Aristotle explained this acceleration of motion in 
terms of the body increasing either its weight (falling stone) or its lightness (fire), the 
nearer it came to its natural place. Medieval commentators of Aristotle, such as 
Simplicius, interpreted Aristotle’s view in terms of the body regaining its ‘form’ in a more 
complete way in proximity of its natural place.9 But an alternative view (defended by 
Hipparchus) was also available in Medieval times to explain why bodies moved more 
swiftly the nearer they were to the earth: acceleration of falling stones could have been 
due to a decrease in the amount of air underneath, as opposed to an increase in the 
weight of the stone itself. Heavy bodies would fall more quickly near the Earth because 
the air underneath them would provide less resistance (vice versa, light objects would be 
easily buoyed up by the underlying air). A third view, popular with Arabic commentators 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 In what follows I draw on M. Clagett (1959), which is the book Kuhn refers to in the passage where the 
‘working in a new world’ claim is put forward in relation to Galileo’s falling stone. 
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of Aristotle, such as Avicenna and Abū’l-Barakāt in turn explained acceleration in terms 
of two opposing forces: what they called a violent mail as a force inherent in the body 
and driving it towards a place different from its natural one; and a natural mail as a force 
that would instead conduce the body to its natural place. The violent mail would slow 
down the body in its initial descent, while the natural mail would increase the speed of 
the body. This view eventually resulted in the impetus theory of John Buridan in the first 
half of the fourteenth century, where acceleration was explained by the increase of an 
intrinsic force called impetus due to some form of permanent natural gravity. With Nicole 
Oresme, impetus was no longer regarded as due to some natural gravity of the body, but 
to an initial acceleration, increasing along the descent. In this way, the impetus theory 
provided a uniform framework for the explanation of both free fall and projectile 
motion. 
Coming to the second aforementioned point, there is significant continuity 
between Galileo’s research on free fall and the Aristotelian tradition, filtered through 
Medieval scholars. Kuhn’s ‘working in a new world’ claim notwithstanding, there are at 
least three main respects in which Galileo borrows from the previous Aristotelian-
Medieval tradition about free fall: 
 
1. Buoyancy in Galileo’s early study on mechanics: in continuity with the second 
aforementioned view (defended by Hipparchus), in his early Pisan treatise De 
motu antiquiora (1589-92, the book was never published and it is referred to by 
Galileo in Two New Sciences), Galileo embraced a similar buoyancy to explain 
accelerated motion in analogy with Archimedes’ hydrostatics (by considering 
the ratio between weight per volume of the body and weight per volume of the 
surrounding medium, e.g., air). Thus, if bodies seemed sometimes to move 
upwards, this was not because they moved towards a natural place (as Aristotle 
claimed) but because they must have had a specific weight that made them 
‘float’ in their surrounding medium.10 It took Galileo some time to correct the 
basic mistake of searching for a sort of Archimedean-like relation between 
velocity change and specific density, rather than searching for velocity change 
with respect to time (which seems to date back to 1609). Moreover, it took him 
some time to clearly articulate how the gravity of a body (as an internal static 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 On the Archimedean origins of Galileo’s theory of motion, see Machamer (1998); and Westfall (1971), 
ch. 1. 
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force) could enter in the explanation of degrees of velocity (celeritatis momenta) 
acquired by bodies in their free fall. On both scores, there are nonetheless 
important continuities with the earlier tradition. 
 
2. Latitude of forms and degrees of speed: a key ingredient in Galileo’s later law of free 
fall, as demonstrated in the 1638 Two New Sciences, is the so-called mean speed 
theorem, which says that the time in which a certain space is traversed by a 
moveable in uniformly accelerated motion from rest is equal to the time in 
which the same space would be traversed by the same moveable carried in 
uniform motion, whose degree of speed is one-half the maximum and final 
degree of speed of the uniformly accelerated motion. 11  The distinctively 
geometrical reasoning underlying Galileo’s analysis of what we might call today 
‘instantaneous velocity’, in the absence of a proper mathematical language such 
as calculus in which to express such quantity, betrays once more Galileo’s debt 
to the Aristotelian–Medieval tradition. Indeed the mean speed theorem, which 
gives uniform acceleration in terms of the velocity at the middle instant of the 
time interval during which acceleration occurs, had been proved by the Merton 
School, most notably Heytesbury and Swinshead, sometimes around 1330s and 
1340s. This geometrical way of thinking about instantaneous velocities in the 
pre-calculus era was in turn rooted in a influential Medieval view called the 
‘latitude of forms’, where degrees of speed could be geometrically thought of 
as intensions (or quantities) of an extended quality, whose overall extension 
was called ‘latitude’. For example, according to the latitude of forms, one could 
represent velocity as a rectilinear line, whose instantaneous velocities could in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Galileo (1638), p. 208. This is because if we imagine a body descending through an inclined plane at 
time 0 2...t t  and acquiring a further degree of velocity at any further instant, and if we now imagine that at 
2t the plane from inclined becomes flat and perfectly horizontal, then we would have that the final and 
maximum degree of speed acquired in the uniformly accelerated motion at 2t becomes the degree of speed 
that the same moveable would now have in its uniform horizontal motion. This means that in the 
following two seconds 2 4...t t , the moveable would travel with uniform velocity on the horizontal plane a 
distance which is exactly twice the distance it travelled in 0 2...t t  with uniformly accelerated motion. So in 
the same time-intervals tΔ , namely 0 2...t t  and 2 4...t t , the moveable covers twice the distance with 
uniform velocity. Hence with half uniform velocity (which recall is equal to the maximum and final degree 
of speed of uniformly accelerated motion), it would cover exactly the same distance it covered with 
uniformly accelerated motion on the inclined plane.  
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turn be represented as perpendicular lines, corresponding to the degrees of 
speed at each time instant. The view became famous through the Medieval text 
De latitudinibus formarum, probably written by Jacob of San Martino, building up 
on the work of Nicola Oresme, around 1359.12 Thus, Galileo’s distinctively 
geometrical way of thinking about the kinematical properties of uniform 
acceleration betrays once more his allegiance to the Scholastic tradition. 
 
3. Acceleration proportional to the time of fall: one of the main obstacles in arriving at 
the law of free fall was the mistaken idea that the degrees of speed were 
proportional to the space traversed (the greater the distance, the greater the 
speed). Galileo himself made this in the famous letter to fra’ Paolo Sarpi in 
1604 where he first announced his mistaken law of free fall as v : s. The first 
Medieval scholar to hit on the idea of acceleration being proportional to the 
time of the fall, rather than the distance was Jordanus in a thirteenth century 
treatise called De ratione ponderis.13 Of course, Jordanus did not have a law of 
free fall, or a law that could express instantaneous velocities, but in a way, it 
shows once more that Galileo’s breakthrough of associating first velocity with 
time, and then space traversed in free fall with the square of the time had been 
made possible by earlier thinkers.  
 
Coming to my third and final point for this Section, what did Galileo see new in the falling 
stone that his predecessors had not seen? If Kuhn is right that looking through the lenses 
of the Medieval impetus theory and latitude of forms, Galileo could see for the first time 
regularities nowhere clearly displayed in nature, one should ask what did he see that 
Buridan, Oresme, and the Merton School could not have possibly seen?  
There seems to be two key moments in Galileo’s discovery of the law of free fall. 
First, the realization, following up on a similar one by Jordanus, that in uniform 
acceleration velocity is proportional to time and not to space. In Two New Sciences Galileo 
clearly defined uniformly accelerated motion as the motion that “starting from rest, it 
acquires, during equal time-intervals, equal increments of speed [temporibus aequalibus 
aequalia celeritatis momenta sibi superaddit]”. 14  Second, the use of an important 
supposition in the mathematical demonstration of the s : t2 theorem, namely that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 For a discussion of this text, its author and possible date of publication see Clagett (1959), p. 395. 
13 Ibid., p. 548. 
14 Galileo (1638), p. 169. 
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“speeds acquired by one and the same body moving down planes of different 
inclinations are equal when the heights of these planes are equal”.15 This supposition 
entered in the way Galileo saw the inclined plane experiments to support s : t2 as a general 
law valid also for the case where the inclination of the plane vanishes to zero, to become 
free fall along the vertical line. I have reconstructed elsewhere the thought experiment 
with arcs and chords used by Galileo to validate the allegedly indubitable status of this 
supposition.16 In that paper, I concluded that what is revolutionary about the way Galileo 
saw the falling stone is the specific way in which Galileo constituted the spatio-temporal 
properties of appearances such as balls rolling down inclined planes (i.e. via the 
supposition of equal degrees of speed over different inclined planes with the same 
height) and then subsumed them under a causal concept (i.e. a weight-related force 
concept such as impeto that entered into the quasi-demonstration of the supposition).  
Where does all this leave us regarding Kuhn’s claim that scientists work in a new 
world, after Galileo? Should we conclude that the phenomenon of uniformly accelerated 
motion was fabricated / constructed by Galileo? What sort of mind-dependence is at 
stake here? In the next Section I address this philosophical question by first 
distinguishing between two possible notions of mind-dependence. 
 
3. Two notions of mind-dependence 
 
In what follows, I want to take some preliminary steps towards distinguishing two 
main notions of mind-dependence, which seem to be intertwined in Kuhn’s ‘working in 
a new world’ claim. These two notions are by no means the only two possible ones (for a 
third epistemic notion of mind-dependence may also be lurking in the background), but 
for the purpose of this paper, I am going to confine my attention to these two varieties 
only.17 
1) (Ontological notion): mind-dependence1 as belief-dependence. Under this first 
notion of mind-dependence, a scientific kind k is dependent upon the belief that a 
person S forms about k. This version of mind-dependence implies an ontic claim 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Ibid., p. 169. 
16 See Massimi (2010). 
17 I have analyzed an epistemic notion of mind-dependence, which I take to represent a somehow Kantian 
view of how reality is affected by our conceptual resources within the context of a discussion about natural 
kinds, in Massimi (2012). 
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about what there is being dependent on us, our minds, and cognitive faculties. There 
are two possible strands under this ontic variety: idealism and social constructivism.  
 
1.i. On the idealistic strand, uniformly accelerated motion is instantiated in nature to 
the extent to which Galileo as a scientist formed particular beliefs about rolling 
stones so as to make immediately visible a regularity otherwise nowhere clearly 
exemplified in nature.  
1.ii. Under the social constructivist strand, mind-dependence1 becomes a form of society-
dependence. On this account, one could make the claim that uniformly 
accelerated motion was socially constructed as a new kind of motion by Galileo 
and his followers, including Newton, via their laboratory life (to echo Latour), 
and that before Galileo, there is no sense to the idea that falling stones had 
uniformly accelerated motion.  
 
2.) (Semantic notion): mind-dependence2 as description-dependence. On this view, a 
scientific kind k is dependent upon a particular description given by a particular 
language L. Under this semantic view, one can include both Hanson’s view18 and 
Kuhn’s view, both in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions and even more so in the late 
1980s essays. Hanson’s and Kuhn’s views are similar and are often discussed together 
in the literature,19 but I want to distinguish between them here. 
 
 
2. i. Hanson claims that facts are “somehow moulded by the logical forms of the 
fact-stating language”,20 namely that “the formation of a concept x in a language 
not rich enough to express x (or in a language which explicitly rules out the 
expression of x), is always very difficult”. Hanson gives the example of Galileo, 
who in 1638 in Two New Sciences introduced the concept of constant acceleration 
for free falling bodies without having a proper language (in the pre-calculus era) 
to express this concept because the geometrical notation, dominant at the time, 
led people to think of velocities as proportional to spaces traversed as opposed 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 See Hanson (1958). 
19 Boghossian (2006), pp. 118-125, discusses the extent to which Kuhn’s arguments can be used to support 
constructivist theses. I have distinguished between Hanson’s and Kuhn’s view in Massimi (2012), pp. 18-
19. 
20 Hanson (1958), ed. used (1972), p. 36.  
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to times. It was only with the introduction of Newton’s fluxions that it became 
possible to symbolise constant acceleration as  v .  
 
2.ii. With Kuhn, mind-dependence2 becomes a form of paradigm-dependence, 
or scientific-lexicon-dependence, whereby a scientific kind k is dependent upon 
the scientific paradigm, or the scientific lexicon (to use Kuhn’s later 
terminology) endorsed by a given community at a given time. Hence, 
incommensurability (in its semantic form, most evident in Kuhn’s late 1970s 
and early 1980s essays) becomes a form of untranslatability between scientific 
lexicons. Already in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Kuhn suggests such a 
semantic reading in relation to the ‘working in a new world’ claim. Indeed, to 
clarify how Aristotelians could not have possibly seen the falling stone as 
Galileo did, Kuhn deploys some resources that became central to his later 
analysis of scientific lexicons, namely the idea that language acquisition is a 
holistic process: “neither scientists nor laymen learn to see the world piecemeal 
or item by item…The child who transfers the word ‘mama’ from all humans to 
all females and then to his mother is not just learning what ‘mama’ means or 
who his mother is. Simultaneously, he is learning some of the differences 
between males and females as well as something about the ways in which all but 
one female will behave toward him. (…) By the same token, the Copernicans 
who denied its traditional title ‘planet’ to the sun were not only learning what 
‘planet’ meant or what the sun was. Instead they were changing the meaning of 
‘planet’ so that it could continue to make useful distinctions in a world where all 
celestial bodies, not just the sun, were seen differently from the way they had 
been seen before”.21   
 
In the rest of this paper I want to substantiate two main points. First, that Kuhn’s view 
falls squarely within a semantic account of mind-dependence; and, second, that semantic 
mind-dependence does not entail ontic mind-dependence, pace any constructivist 
reading of Kuhn. 
 
4. Incommensurability as untranslatability between scientific lexicons 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Kuhn (1962), pp. 128-9. 
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Kuhn’s view falls squarely within the semantic notion of mind-dependence2: while 
the semantic reading is already evident in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, it becomes 
prominent in the late Kuhn where the notion of incommensurability got redefined as a 
form of untranslatability between scientific lexicons. Applied to the conceptual 
vocabulary of a scientific theory, the term ‘incommensurability’ came to mean ‘no 
common measure’ intended as ‘no common language’. Incommensurability amounted 
to the claim that there is no language into which both theories, conceived as sets of 
sentences, can be translated without residue or loss.22 Untranslatable lexicons still imply 
that scientists before and after a revolution work in a new world.  
Kuhn defined a scientific lexicon as the conceptual vocabulary of a scientific theory, 
consisting of ‘kind terms’, subject to what Kuhn calls the no-overlap principle:   
 
no two kind terms, no two terms with the kind label, may overlap in their referents 
unless they are related as species to genus. There are no dogs that are also cats, no 
gold rings that are also silver rings, and so on: that’s what makes dogs, cats, silver, 
and gold each a kind.23 
 
Kuhn associated kind terms with nomic and normic generalizations, where the former are 
laws of nature, the latter are generalizations amenable to exceptions. The same no-overlap 
principle that bars practitioners of a lexicon from importing kind terms into another 
lexicon, bars them also from importing some of the laws associated with kind terms into a 
new lexicon.24 Indeed, in Kuhn’s view, the main terms of any scientific theory are acquired 
together with the main laws of the theory. In Newtonian mechanics, the terms ‘force’, 
‘mass’, and ‘acceleration’ are interdefined and acquired together with Newton’s second 
law as a law-sketch that must be rewritten in different symbolic forms depending on the 
specific problems it is applied to (from the free fall, to the pendulum, to coupled 
harmonic oscillators). Physics students learn that in the Newtonian lexicon free fall is an 
example of ‘forced’ motion (instead of ‘force-free’ motion as it was for Aristotelians). As 
such, it is subject to a suitable symbolic expression of Newton’s second law. These are the 
nomic expectations that the term ‘free fall’ brings along with it as a projectible term, and 
that make the term not translatable into the language of any physical theory where 
Newton’s version of the second law does not apply. Thus, as Kuhn repeatedly stressed, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 Kuhn (1983). Reprinted in Kuhn (2000), p. 36. 
23 Kuhn (1991). Reprinted in Kuhn (2000), p. 92. 
24 Ibid., p. 336. 
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acquiring a new scientific lexicon is equivalent to learning a new language: it requires 
bilingualism, not translatability.  
 There are two main assumptions underpinning the untranslatability thesis. The 
first is the identification of lexical structures with lexical taxonomies.25 So, for example, 
the Aristotelian statement ‘free fall is accelerated motion’ cannot be translated into the 
Galilean lexicon, because although the term ‘free fall’ appears as a kind term in both 
lexicons, the two overlap without the sentence being translatable, because a major 
conceptual change has in the meantime occurred (e.g., from free fall as a force-free 
accelerated motion towards a natural place within the Aristotelian lexicon, to forced 
motion within the Galilean lexicon). A second important assumption is that taxonomy 
must be preserved for translation to be possible.26 But the no-overlap principle makes 
taxonomy-preservation impossible, by barring overlapping between taxonomic 
categories belonging to the same contrast set (while allowing inclusive overlapping of 
genus–species type). We should then focus on this taxonomic requirement to establish 




5. Why Kuhn’s semantic mind-dependence2 does not license ontic mind-
dependence1  
 
How should we understand the claim that lexical structures are taxonomic? From a 
semantic point of view, the taxonomy requirement imposed by the no-overlap principle 
seems to amount to the following claim: 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 See on this point Kuhn (2000), pp. 92–3. I have discussed these two assumptions in more details in 
Massimi (2005), ch. 3, on which I draw here. 
 
26 “The lexical structures employed by speakers of the languages must be the same, not only within each 
language but also from one language to the other. Taxonomy must, in short, be preserved to provide both shared 
categories and shared relationships between them. Where it is not, translation is impossible”. Kuhn (1983). 
Reprinted in Kuhn (2000), p. 53. Emphasis added. 
 
27 In what follows, I am not going to make a distinction between the idealistic and the social constructivist 
strands under mind-dependence1, but I simply take mind-dependence1 as an ontic view about what there is 
being dependent on us (individuals or society) to exist (e.g. for example, social constructivists would insist 
that nature is not just mind-dependent but dependent on our current scientific practice). 
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(A.) If t1 is a kind term in a scientific lexicon L1, then t1 cannot be a kind term in 
another lexicon L2, unless it becomes a sub-kind-term t1
* of a new kind term t2 in 
L2.  
 
In the Galileo case, the kind term ‘free fall’ in the Aristotelian-Medieval lexicon L1 
cannot be imported in Galileo’s lexicon L2 unless it were related to Galileo’s ‘free fall’ as 
an inclusive species-to-genus overlapping. For the taxonomic, species-to-genus relation 
to hold between any two kind terms of two different lexicons, the following condition 
has to hold in turn: 
 
(A.i.)  A kind term t1 of a lexicon L1 can become a sub-kind-term t1
* of a new kind 
term t2   in L2 if and only if the kind k1 captured by t1 can become a proper sub-kind 
k1
* of the new kind k2 captured by t2  in L2. 
 
In the above definition, by ‘kind’ k I mean the semantic kind picked out by the relevant 
kind terms, or if you like, the <kind concept> associated with the relevant kind terms—I 
do not mean ‘kind’ in a metaphysical sense of natural kinds carving nature at its joints. 
Whenever the old taxonomic kind k1 captured by t1  (say, Aristotle’s <free fall>) cannot 
become a sub-kind of a new kind k2 captured by t2 (say, Galileo’s <free fall>), because a 
fundamental change has occurred in this taxonomic category in the meantime (from 
force-free to forced motion, for example), then the two terms are untranslatable, 
according to Kuhn’s no-overlap principle. This change in the taxonomic category results, 
in turn, into a change in the classes of objects picked out by the kind term ‘free fall’ in 
the Aristotelian and Galilean lexicon, respectively (say, the upward motion of fire was 
classified as a force-free accelerated motion as much as the downward motion of stones 
in the Aristotelian lexicon, but not in the Galilean one). So the two classes of objects 
become non-overlapping.    
What theory of reference is at work in Kuhn’s semantic mind-dependence2? 
Kuhn never endorsed Putnam–Kripke causal theory of reference, as he made it clear in 
his response to Hacking precisely on this topic.28 Kuhn argued that in the case of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 This is what Kuhn has to say about theories of reference in his reply to Hacking’s (1993) paper, 
published at the end of Horwich’s volume: “Though the solution he [Hacking] describes was never quite 
my own and though my own has developed substantially since the manuscript he cites was written, I take 
immense pleasure in his paper.  (…) His nominalist version of my position –— there are really individuals 
out there, and we divide them into kinds at will –— does not quite face my problems. The reasons are 
numerous, and I mention only one here: how can the referents of terms like ‘force’ and ‘wave front’ (…) 
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polysemous terms such as ‘water’, any attempt to resolve the tension by introducing two 
terms, ‘water1’ and ‘water2’, to designate two different meanings (water before and after 
isotopes) sharing nonetheless the same referents, ‘is (…) linguistically unsupportable’.29	  
Epistemically, <water1> and <water2> are very different kind concepts, associated with 
different projectible expectations.  
Kuhn then seemed to suggest that any attempt to bypass the ‘working in a new 
world’ problem by explaining how the reference of our kind terms is causally fixed (so 
that despite meaning-change, our kind terms are still referring to the same objects before 
and after a revolution) is not an option. It presupposes exactly the causal theory of 
reference dear to Hacking and Putnam alike, but at odds with the whole Kuhnian 
enterprise of defining kind terms through their corresponding kind concepts and 
projectible expectations due to nomic generalizations. In what follows, I want to suggest 
that Kuhn tacitly endorsed a Fregean theory of reference, whereby the reference of kind 
terms is fixed through the sense, or intension captured by the corresponding <kind 
concept>. We should then ask how the Fregean theory of reference enters into the 
‘working in a new world’ claim, and second, whether it licenses any ontic mind-
dependence of constructivist flavour. 
 How does the Fregean  account enter into the ‘working in a new world’ claim? I 
think there is a distinctive way in which Kuhn is tacitly using a Fregean hidden lemma to 
conclude that scientists after a revolution work in a different world. The Fregean hidden 
lemma enters in the way in which, given the no-overlap principle, Kuhn concludes the 
following:  
 
(X.) For any kind k1 and non-overlapping classes of objects C1 and C1
*, if k1  picks 
out C1 then some other kind k1
* must pick out C1
*. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
be construed as individuals? I need a notion of ‘kinds’, including social kinds that will populate the world 
as well as divide up a pre-existing population. That need in turn introduces a last significant difference 
between me and Ian. He hopes to eliminate all residues of a theory of meaning from my position; I do not 
believe that that can be done. (…) Both ‘water1’ and ‘water2’ [before and after isotopes, MM] are kind 
terms: the expectations they embody are therefore projectible. Some of those expectations are different, 
however, which results in difficulties in the region where they both apply”. Kuhn (1993), pp. 315–9. In 
other words, for Kuhn it is not the case that a natural kind term such as ‘water’ refers to the same stuff 
named in an original causal baptism, irrespective of the conceptual changes that the term may have 
undergone to in the meantime. 
29 Ibid., p. 318. 
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In other words, (X.) captures Kuhn’s conclusion that given any two non-overlapping (i.e. 
non species-to-genus) classes of objects,30 there must be two distinct (non-overlapping) 
kind concepts picking them out. The distinct, non-overlapping kind concepts are the 
result of scientific revolution and paradigm shifts. Ultimately, we work in different 
worlds because our kind concepts have changed during a scientific revolution. 
The argument from the no-overlap principle defined as in (A.) above to the conclusion 
(X.), runs as follows: 
 
(A.) If t1 is a kind term in a scientific lexicon L1, then t1 cannot be a kind term in 
another lexicon L2, unless it becomes a sub-kind-term t1
* of a new kind term t2 in 
L2.  
(A.i.)  A kind term t1 of a lexicon L1 can become a sub-kind-term t1
* of a new 
kind term t2   in L2 if and only if the kind k1 captured by t1 can become a 
proper sub-kind k1
* of the new kind k2 captured by t2  in L2. 
(2.) A kind k1 captured by t1 can become a proper sub-kind k1
* of a new kind k2 
captured by t2  in L2 if the taxonomic changes associated with different nomic 
expectations result in k1 still picking out the same class of objects, now called 
C1
*
 as a proper subset of a larger overlapping class of objects C2 captured by k2 
(I take this to be the Fregean hidden lemma: different intensions associated 
with t1 before and after a revolution may still track the same class of objects, 
provided that an inclusive species-to-genus overlapping of the old extension 
with the new extension is in place) 
(3.) Let C1 and C1
* be the classes of objects picked out by k1 and k1
*, before and 
after a revolution respectively; and let C1 and C1
* be non-overlapping (i.e. they 
do not encompass exactly the same objects and no inclusive species-to-genus 
overlapping is in place).  
(4.) By (A.i.), (2.) and (3.), it follows that the kind k1 is not a sub-kind k1
* of a new 
kind k2   in L2 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Think of the class of objects captured by the kind term ‘planet’ before and after Copernicus; or, the class 
of objects captured by the kind term ‘free fall’ before and after Galileo as soon as free fall ceased to be 
regarded as a force-free motion and became an instantiation of Newton’s second law. 
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(X.) For any kind k1 and non-overlapping classes of objects C1 and C1
*, if k1  picks 
out C1 then some other kind k1
* (i.e., not a sub-kind of k1) must pick out C1
*. 
 
During a scientific revolution, the old kind concepts and the nomic generalizations 
associated with kind terms change, ensuing into non-overlapping (i.e. non species-to-
genus) classes of objects. I want to draw attention to the peculiar way in which Kuhn 
seemed to be using the Fregean hidden lemma (2.) in reaching conclusion (X.). I contend 
that Kuhn is making a non-orthodox use of the Fregean lemma, via his taxonomic 
requirement expressed by the no-overlap principle in (A.). 
First, to the kosher Fregean eye, it is not necessary that different intensions denote 
different classes of objects. After all, Frege’s distinction between Sinn und Bedeutung was 
functional to defend the opposite point, namely that different intensions can still denote 
the same object. Thus, no change to our <kind concept> k1 and nomic generalizations 
attached to it per se implies that our old kind term t1 cannot track the same reference, 
before and after a revolution. For Kuhn’s ‘working in a new world’ claim (X.) as a 
semantic thesis to follow from the Fregean hidden lemma (2.), Kuhn had to introduce 
the additional taxonomic requirement that an inclusive species-to-genus relation has to 
hold between the old extension and the new extension of the kind term at issue. This 
taxonomic requirement is captured by the no-overlap principle, i.e. premise (A.) in the 
argument above, and, I contend, this is an extra assumption, which per se has nothing to 
do with the Fregean view that Kuhn seemed to be subscribing to. 
Second, we should ask whether the Fregean view at work in Kuhn’s ‘working in a 
new world’ claim (X.) licenses any ontic mind-dependence of constructivist flavour. 
Namely, whether it is possible to derive from Kuhn’s semantic conclusion (X.) the 
constructivist conclusion that scientists before and after a revolution literally work in a 
different world, populated by different natural kinds. I think the answer is negative. All 
that (X.) shows, as a semantic thesis, is that if C1 and C1
* are non-overlapping classes of 
objects, and k1
 picks out C1, then k1 must be different from k1
* (i.e. k1
* cannot be a sub-
kind of k1). In other words, given the no-overlap principle (premise A.) and given non-
overlapping classes of objects (premise 3.), assuming a Fregean view of how kind terms 
fix their reference, Kuhn seems to conclude that different <kind concepts> k1 and k1
* 
must pick out non-overlapping classes of objects.  
Does this claim amount to a form of fact-constructivism? I think the answer is no. 
After all, recall that k1 and k1
* featuring in premise (A.i) of the above argument are 
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semantic kinds, not metaphysical kinds; they can be thought of as <kind concepts> 
playing the role of Fregean intensions in explaining how the reference of kind terms gets 
fixed. They are more precisely kind descriptions through which our terms t1 and t1
* get 
hooked up to their referents. To take the semantic conclusion (X.) as implying a form of 
ontic mind-dependence1 is tantamount to reifying Fregean intensions into metaphysical 
kinds. I admit that Kuhn’s ambiguous language on the matter may leave enough leeway 
to speculate here, and it is precisely Kuhn’s ambiguity on the matter that left wide open 
the issue of what Kuhn meant exactly by ‘working in a new world’. But only through a 
constructivist sleight of hand on Kuhn’s behalf, can <kind concepts> ks get reified into 
ontological kinds. After all, that k1 and k1
* are ontologically different kinds (and not just 
different <kind concepts>, or Fregean intensions) is precisely what we need to show for 
ontic mind-dependence1 to follow from semantic mind-dependence2. Thus, claiming that 
different kinds pick out different non-overlapping classes of objects, as per (X.), does not 
begin to show that we literally ‘work in a new world’ before and after a revolution, pace 




To conclude, in this paper I have endeavoured to show three main points. First, pace 
Kuhn the philosopher, even a cursory look at the history of the free fall shows that what 
made it possible for Galileo to see the falling stone as uniformly accelerated was precisely 
an influential Medieval tradition of mechanical studies, ranging from Oresme’s latitude of 
forms to the Merton School introduction of the mean speed theorem. Hence, there is 
significant historical continuity between the way in which the Aristotelian–Medieval 
tradition saw the falling stone and the way in which Galileo saw it.  
  Second, that Kuhn’s view (both in Structure and even more so in later writings) is 
better understood as subscribing to a form of semantic mind-dependence, captured by 
the no-overlap principle and its role for the untranslatability of scientific lexicons. And 
finally, that semantic mind-dependence does not open the door to any controversial 




Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Integrated HPS conference in Athens 
and the Boston Colloquiuum for the Philosophy of Science, on the occasion of the 50th 
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anniversary of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Revolutions (March 2012). For comments and 
feedback on these earlier versions, I am grateful to Alexander Bird, Alisa Bokulich, Don 
Howard, Paul Hoyningen-Huene, Vasso Kindi, John Norton, Stathis Psillos, John 
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helpful editorial comments on an earlier draft of this paper. 
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